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disC/osure Interviews Ida Susser

William S. Haney II
virgins. The whole story cannot be told with ABC. It papers over the c.omplex human reality of the relationships between men and women m a
gender-hierarchy world. It just doesn' t tell any story. It's a way of destroying the kinds of options that might otherwise be available, and bringing up
images of sin, and of women who should have made one decision when
they made another, when the real story is so different. Even putting it into
terms of ABC is confusing and destructive, because it doesn't fit with what
women are going through. Young girls aren't choosing to have sex. There's
rape, and they're being married off at ten, eleven, and twelve, and they have
no access to information or condoms. ABC is a farce; it's a misrepresentation.

Artistic Expression, Intimacy, and the Primal
Holon: Sam Shepard's Suicide in B-Flat and The
Tooth of Crime

Creative Transcendence
As the eccentric genius in Suicide in B-Flat, Niles tries to
create a form of "visual music" that parallels Shepard's
own pursuit of a polysensory theatrical form. Obsessed
with liberating himself from the other, Niles seeks a
purely aesthetic realm closed off from community and .its
intrusive voices. In the end, however, he has no choice
but to reconcile himself with communal consciousness,
partly because the other also inheres in the mind ?f the
artist. Similarly, in The Tooth of Crime, Hoss, the king of
rock music, finds his aesthetic realm under attack by an
arrogant young rival, Crow. ln their ultimate showdown,
their weapon of choice is not guns or music but language.
Like all artists, Niles and Hoss produce through creative
transcendence, but they find that communicating with an
audience also involves a dialogic relation between artist,
art expression, and community. This dialogic re.lation,
moreover, depends on the intimacy between the artist and
his or her most inward self. As Michael Goldman notes,
"intimacy comes from the Latin superlative intimus, 'most
inward,' and the impulse, the desire, perhaps the need to
achieve a superlative degree of inwardness, has haunted
European thought since who-knows-when" (2000, 77). As
argued here, the degree of intimacy between self and
other depends on the degree of intimacy with ~ne's own
self which consists of two aspects: self as socially constru~ted identity, and self as one's "superlative degree of
inwardness." ln the two plays discussed here, Shepard
was influenced by develop1nents in American popular
culture during the 1950s and '60s and wanted to create
what he called "total" theater, or theater "where everything is present at once" (Gilman 1984, xvi}-a process,

dC: After your talk, the question came up about the inequalities of risk in
the United States. There are certain groups, especially African American
women, who are at a higher risk of HIV infection. How does public knowledge of this deepen the risk of stigmatization, thus exacerbating the inequalities and further marginalizing them? Does it?
IS: I think we have to have ways of talking about reality. I think that examples like ACT UP [AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power] point to how people
need to be treated like adu lts. They have to be able to talk about it. Epidemiological data has to be made available. People have to know the story.
Then, if you have respect for people, and people stand up and demand respect, if you provide the information, people themselves will stand up, like
they did with AIDS, and demand treatment, demand dignity in health care. I
think how the information is presented obviously is important. It's more
important that the population themselves recognize it and own it, and fight
it in their own dignified and respective ways. It's like black power movements: you have to know inequality and recognize all of its sides. There's
no point in pretending that inequality doesn't exist. In some countrieseven in Europe, where race is not counted, or in the U.S., where class isn't
statistically added up--it doesn 't do those groups any good. I think it is
extremely important. In South Africa, the data on AIDS was not that public,
who had it and how it spread. I think it's extremely important that, in South
Africa, statistically more Africans have AIDS than the white population,
and that it's stigmatizing is one of the things that Mbeki is willing lo talk
about. But I feel that knowledge is important, numbers are important. But
how you use those numbers and present those numbers is also important.
There has to be some context. Numbers are part of the political battle, always. Certainly you don ' t want to keep the numbers quiet. So that's what I
think.
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as we shall see, that points toward an intimacy with theself as transcendental reality. Although credited with bringing a postmodern aesthetic to the
American stage, Shepard, as I will argue, does not undermine transcendental awareness but rather contextualizes it within American culture through
theater that attempts to create a new intimacy with consciousness itself.
Through an aesthetic symbiosis, Shepard's plays suggest a link between the social identity and transpersonal consciousness of the artist that
forms the basis for intimacy. The intersubjective encounter between artist
and audience, moreover, dramatizes mythic encounters with sacred experien.ce. Antonin Artaud claims that, in Western theater, " the Word is everything, and there is no possibility of expression without it" (1958, 68). Asian
theater, on the other hand, has "its own language" identified with the mise
en scene, one constituted by "the visual and plastic materialization of
speech" and by everything "signified on stage independently of speech"
(68-69). The materialization of speech serves to restore and reinstate the
metaphysical aspect of theater, "to reconcile it with the universe" (70) and
"to rediscover the idea of the sacred" (Artaud 1988, 276). These sacred
elements are not restricted to Asian theater but can also be found in Western
theater. Shepard's plays rely on ordinary language and the Word but also
produce some of the effects Artaud describes in Asian theater: taking the
spectator (and performer) toward greater intimacy with the source and goal
o~ a~-namely, a transverbal, transpersonal experience paradoxically set
w1~lll~ a cultural context. Theater does this by creating what Artaud calls "a
v01d ~n thought" (1958, 71), a state of mind that begins with language and
meanmg and then goes beyond them through a shift in consciousness as
suggested by the creative enterprises of Niles and Hoss.
'
. Shep.ard's theater achieves this in part through a process of transformations, an. idea ~o~o~ed from Open Theater and expanded upon in plays like
Ange~ City, Su1c1de m B-Flat, and The Tooth of Crime. As Richards Gilman
ex~lams, a transformation exercise involves "an improvised scene ... in
which after a while, and suddenly, the characters were asked to switch immedi~tely to .a new scene and therefore to wholly new characters. Among
~he aims (~h1ch were .never .wh~lly clear) were increased flexibility, insight
mto theat.~1cal or actmg cltc~es and more unified ensemble of playing"
(198~, ~;11). Such transformattons, as I suggest, also involve the "decontingenc~ng ?factor a.nd spectator from the boundaries of ordinary language
and identity, allowmg for a greater intimacy with no-mind or a void in
thought-which is one reason these transformations may seem "never
wholly cle~r" in terms of logical discourse. Intimacy with our superlative
degree of mwardness arguably forms the basis for all other forms of intimacy. It involves going beyond the duality of one's socially constructed

identity, beyond the intentional knowledge of the other distanced by a subject/object dualism, toward what Robert Forman calls "knowledge-byidentity" (1999, 109).
William James classified two kinds of knowledge or intentional experience, with the notion of intention entailing a subject's being aware of an
object: "knowledge-about," which we gain by thinking about something,
and "knowledge-by-acquaintance," which we gain through direct sensory
experience (Barnard 1994, 123- 34; Forman 1999, 109- 27). Intimacy on
these levels, however, always contains a spatial/temporal gap that prevents
it from being superlative or complete. Forman refers to the "pure consciousness event" as a nonintentional experience or "knowledge-byidentity," in which there is no such gap or subject/object duality; "the subject knows something by virtue of being it. . .. It is a reflexive or selfreferential form of knowing. I know my consciousness and I know that I am
and have been conscious simply because I am it" (118; italics in original).
As a truly intimate or immediate form of knowledge, nonintentional experience is thus devoid of the dualism of the subject-perceiving-object and
subject-thinking-thought (125). Through intimacy with the superlative dimension of the self, moreover, the spectator intuits the difference between
intentional consciousness, through which we identify with our roles and
egos, and nonintentional consciousness, through which the self beyond
qualities reflexively knows itself through "knowledge-by-identity." Tills
nonintcntional experience encompasses those defined by Western drama
theorists as liminal, sublime, metaphysical, lransluminating, holy, and transcendent, all of which are linked to the void in thought beyond the duality
of subject and object, knower and known. Niles and Hoss, like the rest of
us, have access to this level of knowledge only through a superlative degree
of inwardness, induced in Shepard's theater through paradox and other
devices that defamiliarize by attenuating the boundaries of thought.
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The Primal Holon
Shepard's creative impulse or aesthetic vision of a total theater can be understood through the expressivist theory of the part/whole relationship in
what Ken Wilber calls a "primal artistic holon" (1997, 114-16). Holan is a
term coined by Arthur Koestler (1967) lo describe an entity that is itself a
whole but simultaneously part of a larger whole, in an infinite series, such
that each entity is neither whole nor part, but a whole/part, or holon. In
Suicide in B-Flat and The Tooth of Crime, Niles's and Hoss's creative impulses originate from a primal artistic holon, which bubbles up from the
source of thought or the inner self. This source corresponds to transcenden73
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tal c~nsciousness (turiya) or the transpersonal self (atman) in Shankara's
Ad~~1t~ (nondual) V.eda~t~ (Chakrabarti 1971, 33; Deutsch 1973, 48- 65),
the v01d of conceptions m the Maitri Upanishad (Maitri 6: 18- 19; Hume
192~, 436), and ~taud's void in thought. When manifested through aesthetic form, the pnmal holon enters the artist's conscious mind but not in a
vacuum. Rather, it instantly engages the multiple contexts of 'human existence: the unconscious structures of the mind; our social roles, or who we
seem to be; the structures of culture; and the global currents of the world
about .which we may not even be consciously aware. ParadoxicaJJy, as defined m .non?ual Vedanta, the transcendent primal whole, pure consciousness, . bemg unmanent within as ~ell as transcendent, subsumes and, by
entenng, becomes part of the tangible holons of artists' expressions within
their cultural contexts.
. Thr~ughout Sui~ide. in ~-Flat, Niles resists the intimacy of this holonic
fus10n with commu~1ty m his att.empt to achieve intimacy with the transperson.al self or the v01d .of conceptions at the basis of aesthetic contemplation.
Ultun~tel~, thou~h, h1s success as an artist compels him to accept the reality
of social mtegratton because intimacy with his primal artistic holon extends
outward naturally to include creative expression and community. The intimacy between self and other, like that with one's socially constructed self
~orms part of a larger whole constituted by the intimacy of the primal artis~
he holon, or the transpe.rsonal self. Niles's encounter with this primal intimacy extends beyond his constructed identity to encompass the other on a
~anspersonal level. Hoss, on the other hand, has lost confidence in his ability. to tap int? his primal holon and becomes obsessed with the glamour of
bemg an artist as defined merely by social conventions. As a result his
~xper~ence of in!imacy remains fractured by the spatial/temporal ga~ of
mtenhonal consc10usness.
As .an .unidentifia~le emptiness, the primal holon as pure consciousness
or a v01d m ~ought is knowable, at least initially, not indirectly through
~an~age or ideas, b~t. only through the immediacy (or knowledge-by1denttty) of .transcogmtJve, noncontingent being after language and ideas
~ave run their course. Th.is ~ost intimate form of knowledge beyond duality
mvolves t~e s:If's knowmg itself as a void of conceptions. Whatever thirdperson,. ob1ecttve theory we use to describe it, the subjective "experience''
of a v?1d of conceptions is transc~ltural, transpersonal, and thus largely the
s.ame m any theater, whether Asian or American. Although functionalists
hke Stev~n Katz (19?8) and Daniel Dennett (1991) question the likelihood
~f unmed1ate~ expen:nce, claiming that different types of mystical, Gnostic, or aesthetic expenence do not point to a shareable transcendent source
but merely reflect different cultural traditions, Shepard's work illustrates

that, while all contentful experiences are context related, it is not inconsistent to assume that contentless Gnostic or aesthetic experiences, although
arising out of appropriate contexts, are nevertheless in and of themselves
context free (see Almond 1990, 216). Differences in the expression of aesthetic experience, as Shepard uniquely demonstrates, reside only in the
cultural contexts through which lranspersonal, mythic encounters with superlative inwardness are evoked.
Dorrine Kondo ( 1990) and other postmodernists argue against the unmediated experience of the self as pure consciousness and purportedly demystify the so-called concept of self. As Shepard demonstrates, the deconstruction of a concept as part of a cultural context does not extend to
knowledge defined as contentless experience, for the self in its context-free
status is not a concept. To conflate self and concept (or thought) of self
would imply that a concept is able to engage in thought and simultaneously
be aware of itself in the act of thinking, a claim that holds only if we accept
the postslructuralist definition of the subject as a cultural construct dispersed along a chain of signifiers (Lacan 1978) and subjugated by relations
of race, gender, and power. It would also apply to the generally accepted
definition of the posthuman self (Pepperell 2003; Hayles 1999). It becomes
invalid, however, from an Advaitan perspective that includes the consideration of nonintentional pure consciousness, which, as a void of conceptions,
is the source of concepts as well as the cultural paradigms that artists seek
to amend through the primal artistic holon. In the basic ontological opposition between mincVbody on the one hand and consciousness on the other
(Samkhya Yoga; Pflueger 1998), the latter as the internal observer complements the former, which, as a "concept of self," is a rhetorical construct
based on the " Word as everything" typically associated with Western theater (Artaud 1958, 68).
Shepard questions the unified concept of self as a function of the mind
and, in the process, opens up a theatrical space in which performers and
spectators share an intimacy with the self as a function of consciousness
without qualities (turiya) (see Deutsch 1973, 62- 65). That we can know the
internal observer only by being it and not by observing it (Deik.man 1996,
355) precludes the possibility of infinite regress through which the selfreflexive subject becomes the object of another subject in an endless chain
of subject/object duality. Jean-Paul Sartre, moreover, although without
referring to samadhi or higher stales of consciousness, says that, along with
the awareness of objects in any intentional perception, there is a "nonpositional consciousness of consciousness itself' (1956, lv). This reflexive
"non-positional consciousness," which is nonintentional, Sartre refers to as
consciousness pour-soi (for itself), while the object of consciousness is en-

74

thresholds

disclosure 15

75

Artistic Expression, Intimacy, and the Primal Halon

Haney

soi (in itself): "For if my consciousness were not consciousness of being
consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of the table without consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness
ignorant of itself, an unconscious-which is absurd" (liv). For Sartre, "nonpositional self consciousness" is beyond perception in that it is not itself an
object of intentional knowledge knowable by the thinking mind, although it
nevertheless ties perceptions together. Sartre makes the argument against
infinite regress for "non-positional consciousness" through reductio ad
absurdum.
This theory is comparable to the notion of defamiliarization in Russian
formalism and to the alienation effect in Bertolt Brecht, which Tony Bennett describes as a way "to dislocate our habitual perception of the real
world so as to make it the object of renewed attentiveness" (1979, 20).
Significantly, as drama theorists from Diderot to Stanislavsky and Brecht
have argued, the performer who holds an aesthetic distance between actor
and performance is more convincing in conveying the desired emotion to
the audience. The Brechtian practice of baring theatrical devices by presenting a diversity of visual frames has the effect of exposing mono logical perspectives as nothing more than competing ideologies (Brecht 1964). As
Shepard demonstrates, what Brechtian theater attempts to achieve, with its
narrative discontinuity, refusal of realism; and alienation effect (A-effect),
ultimately is not a distinction between one imaginary unity of mind and
another, but rather a distinction between mind and consciousness, knower
and known. This distinction emerges when the Brechtian gestus-"a gesture, a word, an action" that exposes "the social attitudes encoded in the
play-text" (Diamond 1988, 89)-succeeds in evoking the semiotically invisible; that is, when it directs attention from a self-dramatization to a selfshedding, thereby opening awareness to the coexistence of the silence and
dy.namism, boundaries and unboundedness characteristic of higher cons~10usness: Moreover, as Daniel Meyer-Dinkgrafe (2003) shows, immatenal consciousness cannot be thought about by the material intellect. As
Niles and Hoss demonstrate, immaterial pure consciousness as expressed
~hrough .the primal artistic holon exceeds the material mind, just as the actor
m ~ntenng a dramatic text exceeds the text by rendering intimate for the
audience the presence of a new life that the text does not exhaust (see
Goldman 2000, 50).

dramatizes the manifestation of the invisible identity of an avant-garde
artist. Peter Brook says of holy theater:
All religions assert that the invisible is visible all the time . .. [but]
it can only be seen given certain conditions . . . . To comprehend
the visibility of the invisible is a life's work. Holy art is an aid to
this, and so we arrive at a defmition of holy theater. A holy theater
not only presents the invisible but also offers conditions that make
its perception possible. (1968, 56)

In Suicide in B-F/at, a mystery play about a jazzman gone missing, Shepard

As in holy theater, the conditions of Suicide in B-Flat that render the invisible visible center on Nile's ontological crisis, his attempt to express in the
pure form of jazz the silent or invisible dimension of music, which is transcendent to as well as immanent within jazz. Pushing against the familiar
world, the play expands the awareness of character and spectator by voiding
its content and thus allowing them to share a superlative degree of inwardness. As critics have pointed out (Roudane 2002; Wade 1996), Shepard
often uses baffling and illogical dramatic content, the effect of which is the
decontingencing of conventional awareness. The artist's hallucinatory states,
the arbitrary character turns, the feverish monologues, the mass-cultural
allusions, and the surrealistic antics of the play all contribute to a narrative
line that moves back and forth between visible and invisible reality.
As the play opens, Louis and Pablo, two ineffectual detectives, investigate Niles 's recent murder/suicide/disappearance. They conduct an eccentric investigation, with Louis theorizing and Pablo eventually agreeing that
Niles seems not to have been murdered but rather lo have orchestrated his
own disappearance. But whether he was abducted or murdered or simply
disappeared, Niles presents an enigma for the detectives, who in their conventional mindset cannot fathom a musician's unconventional sensibilities.
Their investigation takes them to Niles's home, where they meet several
musicians, whom they question about his disappearance. As the plot unfolds, Niles enters with his friend Paulette and is bothered by the outline of
his body traced on the floor. Unseen by the other characters, Niles puts on
various costumes, including a child's cowboy outfit, representing the conventional voices blocking his creativity by preventing access to his primal
artistic holon. Although Niles worries about killing off the right voices,
Paulette shoots these costumed figures in a symbolic attempt to exorcise the
ghosts of convention that haunt him. The bullets and arrows she fires comically hit Louis and Pablo. Toward the end of U1e play, Petrone offers to take
Niles ho1ne to confront U1e others and "clean the slate" (Shepard 1976,
153). Niles finally meets the detectives, but, unlike artists, they lack the
desire for intimacy with the more abstract levels of hwnan identity that
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would connect them with a wider humanity (for further criticism of the
play, see Mottram 1984; Hart 1987; Kleb 1989; McGhee 1993; Wilcox
1993; and Bottoms 1998).
In the play's epistemological context, the allusions lo Dick Tracy and
Raymond Chandler suggest that the range of detective work extends from
popular culture and .the whodunit motif to an investigation of something that
s~ass~s computallon and the conceptual mind. Louis and Pablo sel up a
dtshnchon between themselves as public servants and Niles and his friends
as ~ists, or between the outer and inner, the visible and invisible domains,
which are not so much oppositional as complementary, the latter transcendent to but immanent within the former.
While Louis and ~ablo conduct their investigation of Niles's apartmenl
as the seen~ of the cnme, Petrone comes in looking for Niles, blowing silently on his sax. In the ensuing conversation, Petrone refers to the Indian
caste system ~nd twice con:plai~s of being a "Low Dog" (Shepard 1976,
128, 131) ..This lo~ regard imphes that the artisl often registers as an unt~uchable m Amencan society, the apex of consumer capitalism. In the
h.1erarchy of ~erican values, the invisible as represented by Petrone's
silent horn playing not only falls below the visible threshold of the material
~orld but is misconstrued by the very detectives who are bent on revealing
its ~ec~~ts .. Goldman comments on this non-affinity for human intimacy:
Whtie fictional representations of intimate contact have become more and
more detailed and explicit, not only in sexual matters but in the increasingly
~uance? portrayal .of consciousness and speech, the exchanges reported are
mcre~s1.ngly u~sahs~aclory .... Certainly, from the point of view of drama
the cns1s of pnvacy is best und~rstood as a crisis of intimacy" (2000, 79).
Th~ c?nceplual, as symboltzed by Pablo's master's degree, cannot render the mh?1acy of a void in thought, as symbolized by silent music, except
by way of.its own transcendence. The "immaterial cannol be thought aboul"
(M~yer-Dmkgrafe 2003, 11), whether by fully or "half-baked intellectual
notions" (Shepard 1976, 138). With his own crackpot ideas about artists
Pablo a~~es that ~il~~' being po~sessed by his own gift, turned to "religion:
Super~hhon, Cultism to have his demons tamed, with the result thal his
melodies ~ave becoi:ne boring (129), a theory that Petrone rightly rejects. As
a conventional pubhc servant, Pablo naively reverses Niles's true situation:
namely, that of an arlis~ tryi~g to exorcise not his own gift but rather the
demons that, as other vo.1ces, mter~ere with and obstrucl this gift.
La~reen, .a~other fnend of Niles, wheels in a double acoustic bass fiddle ~bile em1ttmg a high-pitched scream. Playing the bass and talking to
Lo~1s and Pablo, she says, "This music has no room for politics" (133) an
attitude that reflects Niles's attempt to separate art and commu~ity.
78
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Throughout this scene, Louis struggles on the floor against killing himself
with a knife, as if possessed by a demon. Louis's demon, however, is not
the kind that Pablo describes as possessing Niles, but rather the kind that
Niles, with Paulette's help, has been trying to exorcise by orchestrating the
death of all the voices that belong to other people, including people like
Louis and Pablo. As a Republican, Louis represents the political, conceptual, role-playing end of the identity spectrum, the culturally constructed
aspect of the self like his partner Pablo, while the artists, especially Niles,
who embodies the primal artistic holon, represent the self as a void of conceptions. At this point in the play, Niles and Paulette appear on stage under
the spotlight, with the action alternating between them and the other characters. This alternation juxtaposes our role-playing identities in the visible
world with the attempt lo reach the invisible dimensions of the self. As
explained below in the context of the levels of language and consciousness
suggested in The Tooth of Crime, nonintentional consciousness or the witnessing self, as the groundless ground of the primal artistic holon, shares an
intimate relationship with music as a unity of sound and form.

Other Voices
Although Niles has accepted Paulette's help lo prevail over other voices
obstructing his way lo the invisible better self, he has qualms about her
ruthless approach. Paulette justifies her method, however, arguing that the
first victim, whose "whole face was blown off," was a mistake (Shepard
1976, 141), and that Niles wanted to find a way out anyway. The gruesome
fate of the first victim not only helps to hide what happened to Niles from
the detectives, who double as agents of social conformity, but also suggests
that the roles of our socially constructed selves, our masks, do not represent
our true identity. On the contrary, identifying with the face as mask not only
conceals but also precludes intimacy with the invisible nature of the inner
self underlying all social constructions, whether conventional or unconventional, avant-garde artist or public servant. Louis, who resists the loss of his
constructed identity and its familiar contexts, says, "We've gotten ourselves
into deep waler here! Can't you feel it? Everything's crazy! I've got to get
my bearings back. It feels like we're involved in something we'd be better
off not knowing about. I never wanted to kill myself before" (138). Figuratively, killing himself implies an unconscious attempt to escape the saturated self (Gergen 1991) and move beyond conventional bearings toward
the openness of nonintentional consciousness. In contrast to the detectives,
Niles invites self-transformation and the wholeness of the self beyond qualities: "All these ones have to go because they're crowding me up. They've
thresholds

79

Artistic Expression, Intimacy, and the Primal Holon

Haney

gotten out of control. They've taken me over and there's no room left for
me. They've stolen their way into my house when I wasn't looking"
(Shepard 1976, 141). The other voices, including those of Pablo and Louis
searching his house, have invaded his inner space, blocking access to his
core identity as pure awareness.
Although Shepard sets up the condition for Niles's liberation the bid
for freedom is not without ambivalence. Niles has become auach~d to the
other voices, the musicians he learned from and invited into his house, and
now says, "I don't want to be lonely" (142). Patrick Hogan argues that the
"absolute isolation of consciousness" leads to a sense of "unbearable solitude" (2~04,. 119), but this would apply only to ordinary waking conscious?ess, .wh1ch mvolves t~e duality of subject and object, not to knowledge-byide~hty of pure consc10usness or the primal holon- the nonduality at the
basis of all forms of intimacy. As Paulette says, the other voices block
N~les's intimacy with his own creative intelligence: "You can't get to any~~~g new. It's always t~e same. :ou're repeating yourself." Niles agrees:
It s not even myself I m repeatmg. I'm repeating them. Over and over.
They talk to me all the time. (Suddenly screaming) Tl IERE'S VOICES COMING
AT ME!" (Shepard 1976, 142). By donning a variety of costumes like the
c~wboy outfit of Pecos Bill, King of Cowboys (whom Paulette ~ill shoot
with a~ arrow t~at hits Louis in the back), Niles undergoes the kind of transformation used m total theater. He switches suddenly from one character to
an?ther, .with the hybridity of his social identity connoting an experience of
bemg neither one nor the other, but an internal observer that witnesses both.
Dressed as Pecos Bill, Niles worries whether it's even possible to kill a
legend. In saying, "You can't kill a myth!" (143), he recognizes the difficu~ty. faced by an artis~ i? going. beyond conceptual content to the primal
artistic holon. Pecos Bill s mythical hold on Niles makes him ambivalent
and u~certain whether he wants to live or die. Paradoxically, the two go
han.d m hand, for death ~f ~he old self comforted by familiar voices implies
~ebirth of the nonpluralistJc self as internal observer. Niles's anxiety of
mfluence compels him finally to accept thanatos, the death of the familiar in
exchange for a new, inchoate. potentiality associated with aesthetic experi~nce. Later, Paulette shoots Niles dressed in a new guise of black tails. This
time t~e b~llet finds Pa~lo, who, like Louis, represents the grand narrative
of logical discourse and isolated constructed identity that Niles hopes to shed.
In th~ ~nal scene, Petrone escorts Niles to his home to confront the
others. Fmdmg Pablo on the floor, Niles accuses him of groveling but
Pablo says, "I was on the verge of prayer" (154). Louis on the other hand
says he lacks faith, claiming to "subscribe to no system' of thought. I'm 0 ~
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the verge of total madness" (154). Niles questions this statement: "The
verge. Only the verge?" insisting there is no point in madness. Ironically,
however, modem science has confirmed a long-suspected link between
madness and creativity. As Neus Barrantes-Vidal says, "Substantial empirical work has shown that both creativity and the temperamental roots of
psychoses have common features at a biological (e.g., high levels of dopamine), cognitive (e.g., a brain organization characterized by a weak inhibitory control that enables loosened or more flexible styles of mental activity), and emotional level (e.g., high openness to experience and phases of
elation and intense enthusiasm)" (2004, 74-75). Like madness, creativity
has its own neurophysiological condition, which corresponds to the "hypoaroused mystical states" that Forman describes as "marked by low levels
of cognitive and physiological activity" (1999, 4). The ultimate hypoaroused state, according to Vedanta, is the pure consciousness event, as
represented in Shepard's play through the primal artistic holon, which is
also a means to the ultimate state of intimacy. Shepard's play suggests,
therefore, that going off the deep end, while resembling madness, does not
have to signify going mad per se; it can also denote the process of going
beyond the duality of conscious content and its corresponding cultural contexts toward the unity of higher states of awareness with their own corresponding physiological conditions.
Although an artist would be more inclined to experience this process
than the average person, anybody can (particularly a theater audience), as
suggested by the fact that Niles is not the only one who appears to be mad.
Pablo and Louis also behave insanely when on the verge of voiding thought,
a process Niles describes in his final monologue:
Are you inside me or outside me? Am I inside you? Am I inside
you right now? ... Or am I just like you? Exactly like you? So exactly like you that we're exactly the same. So exactly that we're
not even apart. Nol even separate. Not even two things but just
one. Only one. Indivisible. (Shepard 1976, 155)
From a postexpcriential perspective, Niles is describing the contentless
primal artistic holon, or what Yohanan Grinshpon would call the artist's
better self or "Vedic otherness" (2003, 4); it is a boundaryless state of nonintentional awareness inherent within yet beyond all thought and creative
expression. Leslie Wade (1996) notes that this passage more than any other
in Shepard expresses the dialogic relation between artist, art expression, and
COffilnunity. It also suggests a fusion of the visible and invisible, mind and
consciousness, artist and community. ln the end, Niles acceptS his social
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responsibility by condemning murder: "Someone should pay for that," he
says (Shepard 1976, 155), implying that cultural and primal holons are
compatible as well as mutually interdependent.
. With ~~icid~ in B-Flat, Shepard illustrates that aesthetic experience,
l~e Gnos~ic~sm, mv~lves a movement of self-redemption induced by purifymg one s mner bemg from the bondage of consc ious content, including
the fragmentary "concept of self' misconstrued as our essentialist identity.
As H. J~nas writes, the spiritual being "does not belong to any objective
scheme, is above the law, beyond good and evil, and a law unto himself in
the power of his ' knowledge"' (1979, 334). The desire of an artist like
Niles, to be elsewhere, to be different, in part reflects what Harold B loom
calls the anxiety of infl uence, the dri ve to discover "what is oldest in oneself' ( 1982, 12), which, being the most inward or intimate, would also be
t?e most universal. As a function of the primal artistic holon, whether Gnostic or aesthetic, this drive to "see earliest, as though no one had seen before
~s" (69), is dramatized by Suicide in B-Flat bu t only suggested by its trace
m The Tooth of Crime.

The Tooth of Crime
Rock Musicians
The Tooth of Crime dramatizes an ostensible paradigm shift within rock
c~lture .through the rivalry between two rock musicians. From an optimistic
vie~om~, a younger, more vital generation supersedes an older one preoccupied with the status quo. M ore pessimistica lly, the ruthless, mechanica l
power of ego displaces a humaneness weakened by comp lacency and loss
of self. Given the constraints of drama, the fi nal contest between Hoss the
~stablished ,~rtist, and Cro":, the brash contender, unfolds in a variet~ of
languages, both real and mvented, through which each contestant vies to
defme himself as the superior artist. The Referee, who sees the showdown
as no contest, an~ounces Crow the winner because of his greater linguistic
novelty and creative self-definition . Shooting the Referee in revenge Hoss
resi~s himself to defeat and ass umes the role of student of the y~unger
man m the attempt to change his identity, at least on the surface. As the play
suggests, however, any real development must originate fro m within and
Hoss, having failed in this regard, gives up "to the big power ... ail the
way" (Shepard 198 1, 249) and shoots himself in despair.
Shepard traces the genesis and decline of an artist who begins as a rebel
but loses courage and ends up "respectable and safe" (2 15). As the play
su.ggests, Hoss's early success and recognition derive from his connection
with the primal artistic holon but begin to slip away once he allows the
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accoutrements of success to distract him from the source of inspiration
wi thin. By succumbing to an obsession with turf wars and fame, he sets
himself up as an easy target for an aspiring younger artist.
In act 1, Hoss says, " Something's lacking. I can't seem to get it up like
the other kills. My heart's not in it" (222). Ironically, Hoss is more concerned with protecting his isolated persona than with keeping alive the
unifying creative powers that helped construct this social identity in the firs t
place. While claiming not to be worried about the "Gypsy" wanting to replace him, he nevertheless admits that he's intrigued: "His style is copping
my patterns. I can feel it already and he' s not even here yet. He's got a
presence" (222). This interest in the Gypsy and in preserving his own dominance undermines his work and status as an artist. As Doc says, "You gotta
stay disengaged, Hoss. The other way is fatal" (222). Significantly, Shepard
reveals that the construction of social identity depends not only on the way
others perceive us but also on the extent to which we stay in touch with the
disengaged inner self, or nonintentional consciousness. For the artist, this
represents the primal artistic holon, the translinguistic source of all artistic
content manifested through contextual expressions. As The Tooth of Crime
demonstrates, both artistic achievement and the constructedness of social
identity are not purely social phenomena but are closely connected to the
individual's ability to transcend the limits of rationalization and logical
discourse.
That Hoss loses touch with his own being gradually undermines his
confidence in himself both as an artist and as a public figure. Hoss says,
Ya know, you'd be O.K., Becky, if you had a self. So would I.
Something to fall back on in a moment of doubt, or terror or even
surprise .. . . Look at the Doc. A slave. An educated slave. Look at
me . . . . I feel so trapped. So fucking unsure. Everything's a mystery. I had it all in the palm of my hand. The gold, the silver. I
knew. I was sure. How could it slip away like that? (225)
The self he refers to has two aspects, not only for himself as an artist but
also for Becky as a nonartist: the public, socially constructed self and the
inner self as internal observer, the former a complex of conventional
boundaries and the latter an infinite, holistic reservoir of creative intelligence. Openness to this reservoir, as the play suggests, determines how
good we feel about ourselves and the world around us. Any blockage to
creativity resu lts in frustration, solipsism, and discontent, inevitably affecting not only our emotions but also our behavior. Even subtle imbalances in
our behavior determine how we are perceived by others, as illustrated by the
consequences of Hoss's inability to disengage. Social identity reflects our
t hresholds
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inner sense of self, which in tum depends on how intimate we are with the
source of our own creative intelligence. For Shepard, this source is available
to all, artist and nonartist alike.
When Hoss exits momentarily at the beginning of act 2, Crow imitates
his walk and sits in his chair, as if tasting victory in advance. When the
contest begins, Hoss finds Crow's aggressive ingenuity with language disconcerting. As Crow spins out new, staccato rhythms, Hoss reverts to the
established languages of older styles- western cowboy, 1920s gangster,
voodoo-and is then surprised when Crow uses ordinary English: "There!
Why'd you slip just then? Why'd you suddenly talk like a person? You ' re
into a wider scope than I thought" (230). As the play suggests, Crow's agility at switching back and forth between everyday language and creative
expressions derives from his connection with the primal artistic holon, a
skill Hoss has long since forfeited by selling out for riches and fame. Hoss
intuits this loss when he says, "This is really weird, me learn in ' from you. I
mean I can't believe myself admitting it" (229). After their initial encounter,
Hoss exits and Crow sings his "Crow's Song," with the refrain, "But I believe in my mask- The man I made up is me I And I believe in my danceAnd my destiny" (232- 33). Although referring to his mask, Crow succeeds
in projecting a winning social identity because of his greater intimacy with
and ability to invoke the creative power of his inner being, as illustrated by
his figurative language, originality, cognitive power, and exuberance of
diction. In the middle of round one, Hoss, feeling outgunned by Crow's
verbal ingenuity and confused by bis violation of verisimilitude, complains,
"You can't do that!" (236).
Crow's language takes liberty with reference, creating its own imaginary context that belies Hoss's past. "He [Crow] was pickin' at a past that
ain't even there. Fantasy marks. Like a dog scratchin' on ice. I can play that
way if I was a liar. The reason I brought you [the Referee] into this match
was to keep everything above the table. How can you give points to a liar?"
(237). Although at one time he was perhaps equally innovative in achieving
his own status as near-mythic hero, Hoss now clings to what he considers
traditional realism, while Crow emerges as the radical innovator who shifts
the ground in the repetitive cycle of modernist change. But, like Shepard,
Crow is not a deconstructive postmodernist. Rather than undermining transcendence, the battle between the rival musicians reveals that the language
of the more creative artist has a disturbingly defamiliarizing effect on his
opponent because of its closer affinity with transcendence or presence.
Derrida, as we know, deconstructively argues with regard to the trace that
"the possibility of the reference to the other, and thus of radical alterity and
heterogeneity, of difference," is always already inscribed "in the presence of
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the present that it dis-joins" (1994, 75). While Crow's nonreferential style
may resemble poststructuralist self-referral, however, it does not undermine
transcendental awareness so much as recontextualize it within American
culture. Hoss doesn't see it that way, of course, having lost his former aptitude for transcendence through the distraction of worldly success.

Language and Presence
For Derrida, transcendence refers only to the relation between inside and
outside, with the outside being transcendent merely to the inside, rather than
being independent of thoughts like nonintentional consciousness as the
internal observer. From an Advaitan perspective, on the other hand, the
other in its radical alterity always already encompasses two dimensions:
duality and singularity, mind and consciousness, with the latter dimension
both immanent within the former as well as transcendent. Crow and Hoss,
therefore, while in some ways radically other on the outside, can be understood as sharing a oneness on the inside, in terms of their social identity as
artists and their affinity for aesthetic experience. Through the self-referral
indeterminacy of his jiving wordplay, Crow invokes the transcendent unity
of the primal artistic holon that Hoss possesses and, at one time, co~ld
reach but has now enshrouded with the familiar duality of the matenal
world that obstructs his view. This materialism bas the effect of directing
Hoss's awareness outward through the five senses rather than inward toward the unity of nonintentional consciousness. In the context of the play,
Crow's figurative language, which attends more to the signifie~ tha? to the
signified, as in ordinary, nonpoetic language, produces an ahenatmg and
even mystical effect.
Explaining literature using the terms of cognitive science, Reuven Tsur
argues that wit and mysticism, when used as artistic d~vices, p~o?uce.more
than the merely conceptual effect of formulating mystic or religious. ideas;
they also "somehow seem to reach the less rational layers of the .~d by
some drastic interference with the smooth functioning of the cognitive system, or by some quite smooth regression from 'ordinary consciousness' to
some 'altered state of consciousness"' (2004, 60). Crow's songs and verbal
dueling, while perhaps not as radical today as when the pl~y was fu:st performed derive from and have the practical effect of movmg the mmd toward a~ altered state of consciousness. They not ·Only display and evoke
knowledge-about and knowledge-by-acquaintance but also provide a taste
of knowledge-by-identity. Tsur claims that even "dead" ornaments, when
revived tlu-ough poetic manipulation, can to various degrees create an experience of alienation (from the familiar world), ecstasy, and transcendence.
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In the case of Crow, the effect depends on whether we consider Hoss from
within the play or focus on today's audience, for whom his style of verbal
play may now seem all too familiar.
Shepard's notion of the influence of an artist, however, is supported by
Tsur's study of the effects of mysticism and metaphysical poetry. The cognitive scientist Steven Katz, moreover, explains how the shock of paradoxes
can take the mind beyond rationalizations and logical certitudes toward a
superlative degree of inwardness:
Such linguistic ploys exist in many places throughout the world,
usually connected with the conscious constn1ction of paradoxes
whose necessary violations of the laws of logic are intended to
shock, even shatter, the standard epistemic security of "disciples,"
thereby allowing them to move to new and higher forms of insight/know ledge. That is, mystics in certain circumstances know
that they are uttering nonsensical propositions, but in so doing they
intend, among other things, to force the hearers of such propositions to consider who they are- to locate themselves vis-a-vis
normal versus transcendental "reality." ( 1992, 7- 8)
Crow's "jive rhythms" involve, at least for Hoss and for Shepard's original
audience, the construction of paradoxes that attenuate the boundaries of
thought. This form of transcendence takes the performer and audience beyond Derrida's inside/outside duality by suggesting the unity of a void of
conceptions. Unable lo cope with Crow's nonrepresentational language,
which forces one to abandon the ordinary levels of mind, Hoss feels confused and insecure.
Indian language theory, first expounded in the Vedas and developed by
the fifth-century grammarian Bhartrhari, posits that ordinary waking and
transcendental pure consciousness yield the experience of different levels of
language. In ordinary waking consciousness, language appears as a temporal sequence and consists of two aspects: vaikhari (outward speech) and
madhyama (inward speech or thought). In nonintentional pure consciousness, on the other hand, the two higher levels of pashyanti and para extend
beyond ordinary experience (Coward 1980, 126- 37). These higher levels,
which are unavailable to the ordinary mind, consist of a unity of sound and
meaning without temporal sequence; all phenomenal differentiations disappear and meaning is apprehended as a noumenal whole. In ordinary waking
consciousness, vaikhari and madhyama give only a partial expression of a
unified meaning or "transcendental signified" available on the higher levels
of language. As suggested in The Tooth of Crime, these higher levels, which
transcend the spatializing/temporalizing movement of difference that de86
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pends on a space/time continuum, are analogous to Crow's musical sp~ech.
This language involves a shift from a referential toward a nonreferentlal or
transcendent reality, which has a defamiliarizing and disorientating effect
on Hoss, now stagnated on the isolating ordinary level of langu~g~ and
consciousness. As we have seen, Suicide in B-Flat also reveals the mtunate
relationship between self and music. Niles's musical gift and Petrone's
silent compositions on the sax suggest the invisible unity of sound and
meaning- the noumenal whole underlying the temp~ral s~quence of phenomenal differentiations. Indeed, as argued here, nonmtenhonal consciousness as the primal artistic holon constitutes the unified source of poetry and
music.
Shepard's dramatic use of open, organic language and mu~ic was influenced not only by European absurdists, such as Arta.ud and ~rran~ello, but
also by American culture in the 1960s and '70s, a time of liberat~on fro~
normative values and academic formalism. As Matthew Roudane puts it,
"Shepard learned from the free associative forms of Beat poetry. He . embraced the improvisational aspects of a free language, of a word-play liberated from rigid structures of meter and logical coheren~e. The ~oetIJ:' of
Lawrence Ferlinghetti and Allen Ginsberg appealed to his verbal unagmation as did Jack Kerouac's 'oceanic' prose in On the Road (1957)" (2002,
4). Suicide in B-Flat and The Tooth of Crime have their roots both in
American Beat culture and more significant, in the transcultural freedom
associated with the internal' observer. Like those of other artists, Shepard's
improvisational forms arise out of his access to deeper levels . of language
and consciousness. Not only U1e Beats but also many others m the 1960s
and '70s participated in widening the gap be.t"':'~e~ st~aig~t and outlaw culture, particularly through the visionary poss1b1hlles mspued by the use of
hallucinogenic drugs such as psilocybin, peyote, and LSD. Dr_ug use al.so
precipitated a transitory experience of the inti~a~y ass.ociated w1~ ~he. uruty
of pure consciousness as the source of creallve mtelhgence ..This mtunacy
underlies the use of autobiographical forms and the exploration of altem~
tive traditions such as Zen and Tantric Buddhism, Hinduism, and erotic
mysticism. William S. Burroughs thought of the nan:ative as. a journey into
a fantasy world where we discover the real. He considered his novel Na~ed
Lunch (1959) to be a holy text, the embodiment of the Word through which
the reader can achieve a sacred experience.
.
The Word as a manifestation of higher levels of language, unavailable
in the temporality of ordinary waking consciou~ness ~d its d~ality of subject and object, is cognized through a process 1? which. meanmg and consciousness begin to fuse, as in the case of aesthell~ expenence, suggested by
Shepard's plays. In light of this distinction, Dernda and other poststructurthresholds
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alists operating on the level of mind attempt to deconstruct the absolute
truth value of that which turns out to be merely a relative manifestation of
the abs~lute (vaikh~ri and madhyama) rather than the absolute itself (para).
Accordmg to Advaita (nondual) Vedanta, because the latter is unavailable
to the temporal mind alone, strictly speaking it can neither be deconstructed
nor legitimated by it. This distinction makes it essential fo r artists, like Hoss
and Crow, to keep open their connection with nonintentional consciousness
the b~sis of a~l intimacy. Otherwise, instead of achieving the status of ~
~ythic her? with whom all can identify, they wilJ merely lose their groundmg and ~omt o~ refer~nce. As Tsur says, "Orientation is the ability to locate
oneself m one s en~ironrnent with reference to time, place, and people"
(2004, 69). Crow's Jive shatters Hoss's "standard epistemic security," as if
Crow were the master and Hoss the disciple brought face-to-face with the
specter of his lost transcendental reality- the only point of reference that
never changes and thus constitutes the source of all stability. After the third
round of their duel, which the Referee calJs a TKO Hoss tries to redeem
himself by imploring Crow, "You could teach me. r' could pick it up fast"
(Shepard 198 1, 24 1).
. J:3ut the cost is high, the new master unscrupu lous, and Hoss not only
d1sonented on all levels of language and mind but also dispossessed when
Crow takes everything as the victor's spoils: "O.K. This is what I want. All
your turf from Phoenix to San Berdoo cJear up to Napa Valley and back.
The ~hole shot. That's what I want" (242). Hoss fa ils to exploit his disorientation f?r the sake of greater knowledge/insight- the universal intimacy
of the v01d of concepti?ns: "This isn' t the way it's supposed to happen.
Why do you wanna be hke me anyway. Look at me. Everything was going
good . ... Now I'm outa' control. . .. Nothin ' takes a solid form. Nothin '
sure an? fi~al. ~here do I stand! Where the fuck do I stand!" (243). Instead
of reonentm~. hims.elf to transcendent reality through the primal artistic
bolo~ b~ revi vi~~ his music at its source. in the self as witness, Hoss yearns
for his" normal worl? of stardom, which he tries to regain by imitating
C~o~. Just help me mto the style. I'll develop my own image. I'm an
ongmal .man. A one.and only. I just need some help" (241). As viewed from
the outside, Hoss thmks of himself as an original man but the inner source
of that orig.inality, the true basis for its preservation: has been overshad?~ed._ Feelmg trapped and defeated, Hoss tries to refashion himself by
1~1tatmg Crow, who .asks, "Are you blank now?" (246). Going blank imphe.s not only emptymg out the contents of one's mind that sustain one's
so~1ally cons tru~ted identity but also attaining pure consciousness as the
v01d of conceptton.s. "':'hat Crow explicitly intends, however, is that Hoss
merely blank out his failed social identity in the vain hope that he can more
88

disclosure 15

readily assume the ruthless role of "A true Killer" (247) like Crow himself.
Yet Hoss, having once tasted the true emptiness of nonintentional pure
consciousness, soon realizes that Crow's manipulating tactics have led him
down a soul-destroying path: "It ain' t me! IT AIN 'T ME!" (247).
In a vain attempt to undermine Crow's self-confidence, Hoss attacks
his image as an artist, calling him "pitiful," a description Crow rejects (24849). Ultimately, however, the play suggests that Crow's victory will be just
as fleeting as Hess's, given that his attention has switched from the primal
artistic holon to the accoutrements of his worldly status he has tried to enhance by defeating Hoss. Crow might be a "master adapter," but adapting to
the socially constructed identity of a preexisting situation cannot compete
with the transformative powers of genuine innovation derived through the
internal observer. Having reached what he perceives to be the end of the
road, Hoss takes his own life, in effect suggesting a transcendence through
death that he fa iled to sustain in life. Although Crow says that Hoss didn 't
"answer to no name but loser" (250), the subtext of the play indicts both
artists for getting distracted from the internal observer as the core of creative intelJigence, and society for allowing money to dictate our values and
detach us from our true self-identity.
What Shepard' s theater makes visible is not just the material, onedimensiona l mu ltiplicity of difference but the radical alterity of pure consciousness on the intimate level of knowledge-by-identity. Niles and Hoss,
like Derrida's trace and other aconceptual concepts, demonstrate that, while
presence as the ultimate intimacy is inaccessible to the thinking mind, it can
still be pointed to by way of suggestion, either through the theater's unsayable secret or through the power of figurative language to allow or make
come a nonordinary level of language and consciousness- the essence of
aesthetic experience available not only to artists and musicians but to everybody. David DeRose claims, "In the end, Shepard's writings suggest that
the rock messiah is an unattainable ideal, the pursuit of which leads to selfdelusion or self-destn1ction" (2002, 230). What this implies is that no rock
star or any other artist can become a mythic hero unless he or she keeps an
open channel to the primal artistic holon. An artist does not attain the status
of rock messiah deliberately, as in the case of a socially constructed identity, but only as an epiphenomenon of the experience of transcendental
reality. While Hoss tries to preserve his social identity as an artist without
regard for its founda tion in higher consciousness, Niles wants to divest
himself of the conventional voices that block his access to pure consciousness as the source of creativity.
Through a symbiosis of the material and inunaterial, mind and conthresholds
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scious~ess, self and community,

Suicide in B-Flat and The Tooth of Crime
dramatize the subtle presence/absence of a contentless realm of experience
that underlies all intimacy and all forms of expression, whether social or
artistic. In setting up the conditions that make perception of the invisible
possible, these plays also reveal the risks of neglecting this possibility.
Howeve~ defamiliarizing or disorienting the emergence of the invisible may
seem, this process occurs spontaneously and even joyfully for anyone who
cares to cultivate an intimate relationship with pure awareness. Because
intimacy as defined in association with higher consciousness brings involvem~nt a.long with nonattachment, it gives one the critical perspective of
an outs.1der 1~ .the sense that one is in while simultaneously not of the context. bemg cntlcal.ly observed. Paradoxically, this unbounded intimacy underlies the Brechtian A-effect, the Sartrian nonpositional consciousness the
primal a.rtistic holon, and all other forms of critical distance to conce~tual
b?undanes, thereby allowing one to discover ever new truths previously
hidden, and to create ever new human possibilities.
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